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Geopolitics

WHAT IS HAPPENING IN GEOPOLITICS? MIDDLE EAST:

DEFENCE ALLIANCE:

  • Israel is in talks with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates to establish a four-nation defence alliance, i24NEWS reported. The report comes amid the news that Washington and Tel Aviv are set to summon a strategic group to work on Iran’s nuclear agreement. Previously, some partners, including French President Emmanuel Macron, have advocated for negotiating an expanded deal with Tehran to include Saudi Arabia and Israel, as well as stronger limits on Iran, but the Islamic Republic has rejected the suggestion.

SOURCE: SPUTNIK


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AFRICA:

SENEGAL:

  • In an attempt to counter Turkey’s expansion in West Africa, Egypt and the UAE seek to consolidate their ties with Senegal, the gateway to West Africa. The year 2020 witnessed intensive activities on the part of Turkey to consolidate its ties with West African countries, namely Senegal.

SOURCE: AL MONITOR


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GCC Detente: Facts, Analysis And Forecasts

GCC Detente: Facts, Analysis And Forecasts

7 JANUARY 2021

GCC Detente: Facts, Analysis, And Forecasts

The unexpected detente between Qatar and its GCC partners saw the full restoration of political ties between them following the end of the over three-year-long blockade against the peninsular nation, but speculation remain about the future of their reconciliation considering the unresolved issue of Qatar’s support for the Muslim Brotherhood and the UAE’s reported umbrage with Saudi Arabia’s decision to go through with all of this despite the uncertainties, though the arrangement will likely survive even if only because its optics serve every involved parties’ interests for the time being at least.

From “Blood Borders” Back To “Brotherhood”?

Analysts have scrambled to interpret the unexpected detente between Qatar and its GCC partners which just saw the restoration of political ties between them following the end of the over three-year-long blockade against the peninsular nation. I analyzed this dispute’s externally provoked divide-and-rule origins in a piece that I published in June 2017 about “The Machiavellian Plot to Provoke Saudi Arabia and Qatar into a ‘Blood Border’ War”, which claimed that the UAE exacerbated tensions between two of its main partners through a fake news hack in order to embroil them in an unnecessary internecine dispute that Abu Dhabi could then exploit in pursuit of its grand strategic ambition to become the Arab World’s next hegemon. Although no kinetic conflict of an international or internal nature ever materialized in either Qatar or Saudi Arabia, reports from last summer confirmed that the former scenario was in the cards until Trump inexplicably quashed it.

Little Sparta’s” Strategy

At any rate, the UAE succeeded in its goal of becoming the most important catalyst of geopolitical change in the Arab World in the years since after Saudi Arabia and Qatar were forced to focus on countering one another instead of leveraging their religious and media influence respectively to advance their regional agendas. Had that not happened, then each on their own might have been able to retain their corresponding edge over the UAE, let alone possibly joined forces to further sideline the overly ambitious state that US military forces once affectionately nicknamed “Little Sparta”. Instead of that happening, they were distracted with one another, which created the space for the UAE to flex to its leadership muscles. It proved its military prowess in the War on Yemen where it also cunningly undercut its Saudi “ally’s” strategy by cultivating South Yemeni separatists, while also brokering peace between Eritrea and Ethiopia as well as pioneering its own “peace” with “Israel”.

Saudi Pragmatism

The recent reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar therefore goes against the UAE’s interests even though it succeeded in buying itself enough time to come out on top as the Arab World’s new unofficial hegemon and the Gulf’s main catalyst of geopolitical change. Nevertheless, the question on everyone’s mind is why Saudi Arabia decided to go through with this in the first place despite Qatar not complying with any of the prior 13 demands that were made of it at the onset of their crisis. The answer can’t be known for sure, but it might very well be that Riyadh realized that the costs of indefinitely continuing this ridiculous feud with Doha far outweigh the expected benefits which nowadays appear further from reach than ever. The Kingdom’s de facto defeat in its War on Yemen, low oil prices as a result of World War C, and its overall regional failures likely contributed to Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman (MBS) deciding to throw in the towel.

The Biden Factor

MBS also fears that he’ll face unprecedented pressure from the US to further scale down his disastrous campaign of destruction in Yemen once Biden takes office (even if the incoming leader only “does the right thing for the wrong reasons”), to say nothing of how worried he is about the possibility that the President-Elect might rejoin the Iranian nuclear deal and subsequently enter into a rapprochement with the Islamic Republic. With these calculations in mind, it makes sense why MBS would go along with Trump’s legacy-solidifying effort to broker “peace” in the Mideast by agreeing to normalize relations with Qatar. The outgoing American leader earns another proverbial feather in his cap while the Saudi one can preempt his incoming American counterpart from weaponizing that dispute against him as part of a forthcoming comprehensive pressure campaign. The UAE, having lost control of events, was begrudgingly forced to go along with them.

Abu Dhabi’s Divide-And-Rule Games Aren’t Over…

It’s not all bad for Abu Dhabi, however, since this detente is mostly superficial as it’s thus far failed to resolve the most contentious issue of dispute: Qatar’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood (which is banned as a terrorist group by Bahrain, Egypt, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and the UAE). Unless Qatar capitulates in this respect, which appears unlikely since a significant share of its soft power is derived from patronizing the organization and its many proxies across the region, then this will remain a divisive variable which could be exploited by the UAE to keep its two “partners” at arm’s length from one another. Furthermore, Doha hasn’t scaled down its relations with Ankara or Tehran which became supercharged as a result of the GCC Cold War, so it hasn’t actually done anything to earn Riyadh’s trust. This will make it all the easier for Abu Dhabi to manipulate the mostly superficial detente between them so that it doesn’t become substantive.

…Or Are They?

That said, one of the sides — be it Qatar or Saudi Arabia — could unilaterally submit to the other in the interests of “regional peace” or whatever else, thereby mitigating the impact of these two currently unresolved but related issues: Qatar’s support of the Muslim Brotherhood and its concomitant closeness with the group’s Turkish and Iranian partners (the latter ties of which are presently unclear but speculated to have improved in recent years). Considering the fact that Saudi Arabia is nowadays weaker than it’s ever been in recent memory, it seems likely that Riyadh might be the one to make “friendly” moves in this direction by simply asking Doha not to support Muslim Brotherhood movements within its borders even if it continues doing so elsewhere. Such a development, which already seems to be in the works behind the scenes given the vagueness of those two countries’ detente, would be extremely detrimental to Abu Dhabi’s divide-and-rule interests.

Keeping Up The Charade

More than likely, however, the GCC detente will probably persist because the optics serve everyone’s interests. Qatar and Saudi Arabia officially patched up their dispute and can now focus on much more important issues of individual and shared interest, the latter of which relates to dealing with the energy market’s global downturn. As for the UAE, it doesn’t want to risk being exposed as the regional spoiler that it’s been over the past few years by making too loud of a fuss about the unresolved status of Qatar’s ties with the Muslim Brotherhood or the possibility of Saudi Arabia looking the other way on this due to Riyadh’s recent weakness. It should be said, however, that this second-mentioned factor is largely due to the UAE’s Machiavellian machinations, so it would be a form of blowback if it results in Saudi Arabia passively accepting Qatar’s continued patronage of the Muslim Brotherhood despite Abu Dhabi’s intense aversion to that scenario.

Concluding Thoughts

The unexpected GCC detente caught many observers by surprise, but that’s mostly because few realized just how weak Saudi Arabia had recently become. It can no longer indefinitely remain hyper-focused on Qatar at the expense of its other interests after its regional strategy collapsed as a result of being dragged into this dispute and likely also the War on Yemen due to the UAE’s Machiavellian machinations. It’s unclear whether MBS realizes that he’s been played for a fool by his mentor Mohammed Bin Zayed (MBZ), or if this will ever even happen, but what’s important to pay attention to is how the Emirati leader responds to this new regional development. It’s the first time in several years that he’s lost control of events, and he certainly isn’t happy about it since he’d have preferred to have his countries’ two “partners” strategically bleed one another dry while his own continues rising in the aftermath. Whether he plays the spoiler or not, only time will tell.

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By Andrew Korybko

American political analyst

Tags: GCC, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, UAE.


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Russia’s Red Sea Base In Sudan Is A Recalibration Of Its Intra-Ummah Balancing Act

Russia’s Red Sea Base In Sudan Is A Recalibration Of Its Intra-Ummah Balancing Act

16 NOVEMBER 2020

Russia

Russia’s draft deal to open up a Red Sea naval base in Sudan amounts to a strategic recalibration of its careful “balancing” act between the GCC and Turkey after moving more closely to the latter following the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh War, which in turn shows how important Moscow regards its “Ummah Pivot” as being by seeking to maintain equally excellent relations with all majority-Muslim countries without any of its bilateral relations being misperceived as directed against any third country in this civilizational sphere.

A Deal Three Years In The Making

Some observers were surprised by reports late last week that a Russian government website published details of a draft deal pertaining to Moscow’s plans to open up a Red Sea naval base in Sudan, but this was actually something that’s been openly discussed for the past three years already. The author wrote about former President Bashir’s public invitation for Russia to do exactly just that during his visit to the Eurasian Great Power in November 2017 in his piece titled “Here’s Why Russia Might Set Up A Red Sea Base In Sudan”. The geopolitical situation has considerably changed since then following his overthrow last year, which the author also recently analyzed at length in an article about how “The Sudanese-‘Israeli’ Peace Deal Required Lots Of Behind-The-Scenes Maneuvering”, but some of his insight from that time is still relevant.

Russia’s Silk Road & “Democratic Security” Interests

For instance, Russia indeed hopes to gain influence along China’s prospective Sahelian-Saharan Silk Road that he first identified in early 2017 and which is expected to terminate precisely in Port Sudan, which is where Moscow plans to open up its naval base. There are still domestic military dimensions to this draft deal which could be taken advantage of by Sudan, though not necessarily in terms of preventing the country’s further Balkanization considering the recent peace deal between its warring sides. More specifically, they likely relate to the “Democratic Security” strategies that the author summarized in his October 2019 piece written during the first-ever Russia-Africa Summit about how “Africa Needs Russia More Than Ever, And This Week’s Sochi Summit Proves It”, in which some hyperlinks are now broken but can still be accessed via other sites.

The “Ummah Pivot”

The most pertinent point made in his prior topical analysis, however, relates to Russia’s “balancing” act. The hyperlinked piece from the preceding sentence introduced the author’s concept of the “Ummah Pivot”, which he describes as the recent prioritization of Russia’s relations with majority-Muslim countries stimulated by the West’s anti-Russian sanctions of the past six and a half years. Many observers predicted Russia to “pivot eastward” in the face of that economic warfare campaign, but in reality, the country ended up pivoting southward towards the international Muslim community (“Ummah”) in order to optimize its continental “balancing” strategy by incorporating a third element (the Ummah) into this supposedly binary choice between East (China) and West (EU).

The Unofficial Russian-Turkish Alliance

In the present geostrategic conditions, there’s little doubt after the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh War that Russia and Turkey are the new power duo in the “Greater Mideast”, which the author coined “Putogan” in his latest analysis on the topic titled “Analytical Reflections: Learning From The Nagorno-Karabakh Fiasco”. Less than a week prior, he noted that “Russia & Turkey Stand To Lose The Most From A Biden Presidency”, predicting that the simultaneous pressure that might likely be placed upon them in that scenario could result in them being pushed into an unofficial alliance out of pragmatic necessity. That potential outcome would risk giving off the optics that Russia is a partisan player in the cold war between Turkey and the GCC, however, hence the need to preemptively recalibrate that aspect of its “balancing” act within its larger “Ummah Pivot”.

The Unofficial Russian-Emirati Alliance

Post-coup Sudan is practically a GCC protectorate nowadays, and it wouldn’t have been possible for Russia to clinch its draft deal for a Red Sea naval base in Port Sudan without the approval of the North African state’s new Gulf overlords. They seemingly understand the importance of improving military interoperability with Russia through the joint naval drills that they’ll likely carry out in the Red Sea upon this agreement’s conclusion. The UAE in particular is the most important extra-regional player in this strategic waterway as a result of its newly established bases in Eritrea and the de-facto independent Somali and Yemeni regions of Somaliland and South Yemen, as well as its hegemonic influence over Ethiopia after brokering its historic peace deal with Eritrea two years back. Russia has also been seeking to cultivate closer state-to-state military ties with the UAE as well.

The Syrian Convergence

Unofficially allying with the UAE in this trans-regional space could “balance” its unofficial alliance with Turkey elsewhere in the “Greater Mideast”, thus reinforcing the impression that Russia is indeed the neutral partner that it presents itself as being in the Ummah. This in turn preemptively thwarts any misperception about the grand strategic motives behind its “Ummah Pivot”, thus helping it to maintain its careful “balancing” act in this civilizational space. The two halves of its intra-Ummah “balancing” act might ultimately converge in Syria where Turkey and the GCC are intensely competing in this geostrategic state where Russian influence undoubtedly predominates. It would be a diplomatic masterstroke if Moscow was able to leverage its “balancing” act in pursuit of a lasting political solution there, though it’ll still take lots of time and skill to achieve, if ever.

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By Andrew Korybko

American political analyst

Tags: Russia, Sudan, Horn Of Africa, Red Sea, UAE, Turkey, Ummah Pivot, Balancing, China, BRI.


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Geopolitical conflicts

Middle East

MIDDLE EAST

  • UAE: United States is planning to sell advanced defense capabilities -that are worth $23.37 billion-to United Arab Emirates, a longtime vital U.S. security partner. The sale will make the UAE even more capable and interoperable with U.S. partners in a manner fully consistent with America’s longstanding commitment to ensuring Israel’s Qualitative Military Edge.

SOURCE: STATE GOV US

 

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MIDDLE EAST

  • UAE: United Arab Emirates urged the need to confront Turkey’s expansionist agenda in the region, and accused the Turkish leader of spreading the Muslim Brotherhood ideology.

SOURCE: ASHARQ AWSAT

 

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The Geopolitical Impact Of The ‘Israeli’-Emirati Alliance Will Be Felt In Africa

The Geopolitical Impact Of The ‘Israeli’-Emirati Alliance Will Be Felt In Africa

17 SEPTEMBER 2020IS_AF

 

The misleadingly described “peace” deal between “Israel” and the UAE will enable the self-professed “Jewish State” to use the latter’s military and civilian port infrastructure in the Gulf of Aden, thus challenging recent Turkish inroads in this part of the world and allowing Tel Aviv to project itself as a trans-regional power of significance, especially in East Africa and eventually everywhere else on the continent too.
 

From Diplomatic “Peace” To Military Partnership

Israel” and the UAE finally formalized their hitherto not-so-secret ties earlier this week after agreeing to a misleadingly described “peace” deal brokered by the US. The author recently explained the regional strategic and soft power dividends that the self-professed “Jewish State” hopes to achieve through this development in his piece about how “The US-Brokered Mideast ‘Peace’ Deals Aren’t What They Seem”, so this present piece will therefore discuss its most likely trans-regional geopolitical dividends. The UAE commands a vast empire of military and civilian ports across the world, but the most important jewels in its crown are found in the Gulf of Aden region, specifically in Eritrea, South Yemen (including the strategic Socotra Islands), and the internationally unrecognized Somali breakaway region of Somaliland. It’s therefore predicted that “Israel” will soon have access to these facilities for the purpose of projecting itself as a trans-regional power of significance.

Containing” Turkey

Although Turkey hasn’t withdrawn its decades-long recognition of “Israel”, President Erdogan has recently presented himself as the most high-profile supporter of the Palestinians. He’s also at odds with the UAE since the Gulf State fears his ideological alliance with its Muslim Brotherhood foes, especially those based in nearby Qatar. For this reason, both “Israel” and the UAE have vested interests in “containing” the spread of Turkish influence, which they can attempt to do in East Africa by combining their military and other potential in and around the Bab el Mandeb chokepoint following their mutual recognition of each other. It’s unclear how this would play out in practice, but there’s no denying the impact that a more visible “Israeli” military presence in the UAE’s relevant ports would have on changing the regional narrative in all respects. If anything, it would at the very least boost “Israeli” prestige, both at home and in the targeted region, especially the African hinterland where the self-professed “Jewish State” has been silently expanding its influence over the past decade.

The African Angle

To explain, “Israel” already has considerable influence in East Africa, especially in Ethiopia, South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda, and Rwanda. It naturally follows that it would like to expand its reach to the littoral region along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden in order to entrench its influence in this larger space, hence the need for more closely cooperating with the UAE to that end. “Israel” and Eritrea already have relations with one another, but the UAE is the latter’s dominant partner since it uses its territory for waging the War on Yemen. The self-professed “Jewish State” can now “piggyback” on the its official ally’s military gains there to do the same, just like in South Yemen and Somaliland. Taken together, the military dimensions of the “Israeli”-Emirati alliance perfectly complement the diplomatic and economic (agricultural, electrical hydrologicaltelecommunication) influence that it’s already established to solidify its sway. The only “holdouts” are Sudan, which is already under the UAE’s influence after its military coup, tiny Djibouti, and Somalia, the last of which hosts a Turkish base.

Cultivating UN Support On The Continent

“Israel’s” trans-regional strategy with the UAE, using the Gulf of Aden as its springboard for expanding influence into Africa, is therefore twofold. Firstly, it hopes to “contain” Turkish influence in this part of the world, and secondly, it wants to leverage its predicted gains to recruit more diplomatic allies in the UN. That global body’s resolutions are superficial since they lack any enforcement mechanism, but they’re still an impressive soft power tool for shaping perceptions. Since the UAE is becoming more active in the African hinterland, both on its own independent initiative and to counter Turkish influence there, “Israel” hopes to combine their efforts to turn targeted states away from the Turks and towards the “Israeli”-Emirati alliance instead. Incentives such as loans and investments (in the earlier described spheres) could basically buy off corrupt governments there who have little to lose by siding with those two since it’s extremely unlikely that voting in support of “Israel” at the UN will set off a pro-Palestinian Color Revolution anywhere on the continent.

Concluding Thoughts

Many commentators have already extensively discussed the implications of “Israel” and the UAE’s mutual recognition on Mideast geopolitics, but few other than the author have asked what the future holds for Africa in this respect. The UAE is already the predominant power in the interconnected Horn of Africa-Gulf of Aden region, so it naturally follows that its “Israeli” ally will “piggyback” off of gains there to combine them with its existing accomplishments in the East African hinterland. Together, “Israel” and the UAE might pool their efforts in order to seriously challenge Turkish influence on the continent, which has been spreading over the past decade despite most foreign observers being unaware of this fact except when it comes to North Africa. The overarching trend is that foreign powers — which include “Israel”, the UAE, and Turkey, but also the US, France, India, Russia, and China — are increasingly “scrambling” for Africa in order to improve their grand strategic prospects in the emerging Multipolar World Order, and it’s only a matter of time before they clash.

EgjymzKXcAEZe3b 

American political analyst

Tags: Israel, UAE, Turkey, Africa, Horn of Africa, Yemen, South Yemen, Eritrea, Somalia, Somaliland, East Africa.